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UNCLAIMED PROPERTY-A POTENTIAL SOURCE
OF NON-TAX REVENUE
I. INTODUCrION
All states have statutes providing for the escheat of property, at least
in the situation where the owner dies intestate with no heirs.' Most states
have enacted more complete legislation in the area of escheat, establishing
procedures whereby the disposition of various items of unclaimed and
abandoned property may be governed by the state.2 Such statutory pro-
visions, frequently referred to as "escheat" statutes, are primarily derived
from two ancient doctrines, escheat and bona vacantia.3
The concept of escheat can be traced to the twelfth century and was
an incident of tenure under the feudal system. If upon the death of a fee
owner of land there was no heir capable of performing the services of
tenure, the land reverted to the mesne lord. In the absence of a mesne
lord, or if the land was held directly from the Crown, the land reverted
immediately to the Crown as ultimate owner.4 This reversion of land
upon the disruption of tenure was referred to as escheat.
Although only real property was subject to escheat, certain items of
personalty also could be taken under the doctrine of bona vacantia
whereby the Crown took items of personal property not as ultimate
owner, but rather for the sole reason that there was no other owner. The
claim of the Crown was thought to be superior to that of a stranger and
therefore had the effect of eliminating conflict among private claimants.
Bona vacantia was not applicable to all items of unclaimed personalty;
to many such items a finder's claim was good against all except the true
owner.5
Modern statutes typically combine the theories of escheat and bona
vacantia and are applicable to both real and personal property.5 Although
1. Garrison, Fscheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and their Revenue As-
pects, 85 Ky. L.J. 302, 304 (1947). Missouri's escheat statute for property of a
decedent is found in RSMo § 470.010 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 1, at 304; Comment, Escheat of Corporate
Intangibles: Will the State of the Stockholder's Last Known Address be Able to
Enforce Its Right?, 41 NoTRE DAME LAW. 559, 560 (1966); Comment, A Survey
of State Abandoned or Unclaimed Property Statutes, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 85, 85
(1964). See also note 13 infra.
3. See Garrison, supra note 1, at 303; Note, Origins and Development of
Modern Escheat, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1319, 1326-27 (1961); Comment, 41 NoTRE
DAMS LAW., supra note 2, at 560.
4. See Comment, 41 NoTaR DAME LAW., supra note 2, at 559. See generally
30A C.J.S. Escheat § 1 (1965).
5. See generally authorities cited note 3 supra. The right under which
the Crown claimed title was referred to as "title by occupancy."
6. See Garrison, supra note 1, at 304; Comment, 41 NoTmE DAME LAW.,
supra note 2, at 560; Comment, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J., supra note 2, at 85.
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not true escheat provisions in the historical sense of the word, these
statutes are commonly referred to as such, and the term escheat is now
used to describe the transfer of custody or title to the state. Modem
escheat legislation generally falls into one of two basic pattems.7 The
first type of provision closely resembles a true escheat: title to the property
vests in the state after the expiration of a definite period of time. Once
title has vested, the true owner's claim is barred.8 Under the second type
of provision, the owner's claim is never barred. These custodial acts
simply give the state possession and use of the property so long as it
remains unclaimed. "The true owner, his heirs, or his assigns can claim
it at any time."9 The most comprehensive act governing the disposition
of unclaimed property, the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property
Act (Uniform Act), is custodial in nature.' 0
II. THE UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT
The purpose of this Comment is to encourage the adoption of the
Uniform Act by the state of Missouri. It will deal primarily with the
provisions of the Uniform Act and the problems encountered thereunder,
and the advantages obtained by an adopting state.
A number of considerations prompted the development of the Uni-
form Act in 1954 and continue to support its adoption. The Uniform
Act has three objectives: to protect unknown owners of property by
locating them whenever possible and restoring their property; to prevent
unjust enrichment of holders of unclaimed property while relieving them
of further annoyance, expense, and liability; and to give to the state the
benefit of revenues generated by such property while it remains un-
claimed.1 1
A. Revenue Generated Under the Uniform Act
The amount of revenue generated by passage of a comprehensive
escheat act has been substantial in a number of states, particularly during
the first few years subsequent to enactment. For example, in New Jersey,
which had adopted legislation prior to approval of the Uniform Act, the
amount collected during the first year alone was approximately $1,175,000.
In New York, another highly industrialized state, $38,500,000 was collected
in the first thirteen years following enactment of comprehensive escheat
7. Comment, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW., supra note 2, at 560.
8. Note, Modern Rationales of Escheat, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 95 (1963). For
an example of such legislation, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-29 (West Supp. 1978).
9. Comment, 41 NoTRE DAmE LAw., supra note 2, at 560.
10. UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, Commissioners'
Prefatory Note (1954 Version). This Act can be found in 8 UNxros LA-wS AN-
NOTATED 81 (1972).
11. UNIFORM DISPOSION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACr, Commissioners!
Prefatory Note (1954 Version). See, e.g., State v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 261
Cal. App. 2d 609, 68 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1968); In re Monks Club, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d
845, 394 P.2d 804 (1964).
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legislation. Michigan collected $2,500,000 in its first year alone, and
Pennsylvania collected $5,000,000 in the first seven years of operation.'2
The experience of states has varied, but the financial benefit has proved
substantial as evidenced by the widespread adoption of such legislation.'3
Missouri now is almost surrounded by states which have some type of
comprehensive escheat legislation. Arkansas and Tennessee, upon adoption
of the Uniform Act in 1978, became the last of forty-six states which have
adopted some form of comprehensive escheat legislation.' 4 Of the states
which border Missouri, only Kansas has not yet adopted comprehensive
legislation. 15
B. Avoiding the Threat of Multiple Liability
Although the revenue aspect admittedly has been the strongest moti-
vation for adoption of the Uniform Act, it was only one of several reasons
for its development. Probably the strongest impetus for the development
of the Uniform Act was the threat of multiple liability. This threat was
present because the holder of unclaimed intangible property was potenti-
ally subject to the jurisdiction of more than one state.' 6
The prospect of multiple liability was suggested by two United
States Supreme Court decisions,' 7 the last of which was decided only
three years prior to the approval of the Uniform Act.' 8 In Connecticut
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Moore,'9 the state of New York was allowed to
take custody of unclaimed funds due on insurance policies issued to
persons residing in New York, even though the insurance company was
12. Examples of revenues generated under the Uniform Act are found in
McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corporation Lawyer,
14 Bus. LAw. 1062, 1066 (1959).
13. To date, 46 states have adopted comprehensive legislation in this area.
Thirty-three have adopted some version of the Uniform Act; the others, Alaska,
Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming, have
adopted legislation not patterned after the Uniform Act. States which have not
yet adopted comprehensive legislation are Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, and Ohio.
Ohio does have more provisions for escheat of unclaimed property than does
Missouri, but these provisions are scattered throughout its code and are not as
complete as those in other states which have adopted comprehensive legislation.
14. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-620 to -647 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 64-2901 to -2932 (Supp. 1979). While Arkansas was one of the first 10 states
to adopt comprehensive legislation in the area of escheat, in 1978 the Uniform
Act was adopted to replace the state's prior provisions.
15. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-620 to -647 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
141, §§ 101-130 (Smith-Hurd 1964 & Supp. 1979); IowA CODE §§ 556.1-.36 (1978);
Ky. RFv. STAT. §§ 393.010-.250 (1978); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 69-1301 to -1329 (1978);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 651-687 (1979); TrNN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-2901 to -2932 (1978).
16. UNiFoaim DISPOSTON OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT § 10, Commissioners'
Note (1954 Version).
17. See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); Connecticut
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
18. The Uniform Act was first approved in 1954 and was revised in 1966.
19. 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
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domiciled in another state.20 The transaction of business Within New
York was held to provide a satisfactory basis for its jurisdiction.21' Justice
Jackson, in a strong dissent, criticized the majority for its failure to con-
sider the potential conflicts which could result. He listed numerous
other states which could establish jurisdiction and attempt to escheat
the same property.22 In Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey,28 the threat of
multiple liability posited by Justice Jackson became a reality. The Court
sustained the power of the state of corporate domicile, New Jersey, to
escheat unclaimed intangible property belonging to persons whose last
known address was in New York.2 4 The Court again refused to address
the issue of multiple liability, stating that the conflict was not before
the Court.2 5 It indicated, however, that the full faith and credit clause of
the United States Constitution would bar any such double liability.26
Thus began the "race of diligence," whereby each state rushed to be
first to escheat, hoping to bar later claimants and secure the revenue for
itself.27 These threats of multiple liability and the necessity for a "race
of diligence" prompted the formation of a committee to draft a uniform
20. Id. at 549. "Domicile" is a term which has been given a number of
meanings in our legal system. As used by the courts in the area of escheat, how-
ever, it apparently refers to the state in which the corporation is organized. See
Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206, 218 (1972).
21. 333 U.S. at 551. The Court found that the obligations were created
through acts done within the state under the protection of New York law and
that sufficient contacts were established to justify seizure of the unclaimed property.
22. Id at 556. (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson further stated:
If we say that New York may step into the beneficiary's shoes and col-
lect his unclaimed insurance proceeds solely because the insured lived in
New York when the policy issued for delivery there, how can we deny
the claim of another state to escheat the same fund when its claim is
asserted under any one or more of the following circumstances: (1) It is
the state in which the insured has died.... (2) It is the state in which
the beneficiary has resided and was last known to reside. (8) It is the
state of a proved later and longer residence of the insured. (4) It is the
state to which both the insured and the beneficiary removed and resided
after the policy was taken out in New York. (5) It is the state of actual
permanent domicile, as opposed to mere residence in New York, of the
insured and the beneficiary. (6) It is the state of actual delivery of the
policy.... (7) It is the state where the claim is payable and where the
funds for its discharge are and at all times have been located.
Id. at 558-59 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
23. 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
24. Id. at 441.
25. Id. at 443.
26. Id. As the Court later determined in the case of Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961), however, the full faith and credit clause is
not always an effective barrier to multiple liability. A state court judgment need
not be given full faith and credit as to property or parties not subject to the
jurisdiction of that court. Other states, who assert a claim to the same property
and are not subject to the earlier court's jurisdiction are not barred.
27. UNiFoPm DisposrmN oF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr, Prefatory Comment(1966).
[Vol. 45
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act. The goal was to dispose of these problems in a just and orderly man-
ner and to provide guidelines to holders faced with conflicting claims. 28
III. SUBSTANTIVE SxcErIONS OF THE UNIFORm AcT
While the Uniform Act is composed of thirty-two sections, only the
more important substantive provisions will be discussed in this Com-
ment.29 The major objections to the Uniform Act which have been en-
countered by states which have adopted it and the manner in which the
courts have dealt with these objections also will be discussed, as will
remaining problems which the adopting state might remedy by modify-
ing the Uniform Act. Existing Missouri legislation pertaining to a par-
ticular section of the Uniform Act will be dealt with in conjunction with
that section.
Section two of the Uniform Act establishes criteria under which
deposits made with banking organizations, funds paid toward shares in
financial organizations other than banks, other forms of obligations of
both banks and financial organizations, and the contents of safe deposit
boxes may be presumed abandoned. The acts of deposit and payment
must be performed within the state, safe deposit boxes must be located
within the state, and any written instrument on which a bank or financial
organization or business association is directly obligated must have been
issued within the state.30 In addition, seven years must have elapsed with
no indication by the owner of any interest in the property.3 1 In a case
28. Id. In 1961 the problem of multiple liability of a holder subject to
the jurisdiction of more than one state finally was adjudicated by the Supreme
Court. Acknowledging that the full faith and credit clause would not effectively
bar multiple escheat, the Court terminated the threat of multiple liability on
due process grounds. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71(1961). Not until 1965, however, did the Court end the "race of diligence" by
establishing priority rules among the various claimants. See Texas v. New Jersey,
379 U.S. 674 (1965).
29. For two informative articles on procedures which should be utilized by
corporate holders of unclaimed property attempting to comply with the Uniform
Act, see Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAw. 791 (1960); McBride,
supra note 12, at 1062.
30. UNiFoRm DisposrroN OF UNCLAIMrm PROPERTY Acr § 2 (1954 Version).
The requirement that all events take place within the state serves as a basis on
which to claim' jurisdiction, and also makes it more convenient for all parties
involved. For a discussion of the problems in obtaining jurisdiction, see text
accompanying notes 60-66 infra.
31. UNIFoRm DIsPOsrrION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Aar § 2 (1954 Version).
This section does not require the property to be owed to a resident of the state.
Under the Uniform Act, property owed to a nonresident may be claimed unless
the state of residence has enacted a reciprocal provision similar to § 10 of the
Uniform Act. See text accompanying notes 51 & 52 infra. Texas v. New Jersey,
379 U.S. 674 (1965), however, impacts upon this provision. That decision may
be interpreted to allow only the state of last known address to escheat property
if that state has an escheat provision applicable thereto, whether or not it has a
reciprocal provision. To safeguard against differences in interpretation, an adopt-
ing state would be wise to amend the Uniform Act to that effect. Thus, the state
could only claim property owed to a nonresident if (1) that state were the state
1980]
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which illustrates the breadth of this section, the state of Oregon sued
the Multnomah Kennel Club to escheat sums retained by the club to pay
winning wagerers who had failed to collect.3 2 The section was applicable
to such an organization, but the required seven years had not yet elapsed.
The written instruments were found not to be "payable," i.e., due, until
the winning tickets were presented; only then would the seven year
period commence. Missouri has a statute providing for the escheat of un-
claimed sums upon the statutory liquidation of a banking organization, 33
but unclaimed funds held by solvent banks, as well as funds held by other
financial organizations, apparently are unaffected by the statute.34
Abandonment of life insurance funds owing to one whose last known
address is within the state is dealt with in section three of the Uniform
Act. The state of incorporation and principal place of business are
ignored as potential bases for jurisdiction because their use would result
in a few states receiving most of the funds regardless of the last known
address of those entitled to them.3 5 Life insurance policies are deemed
to be matured if in force when the insured has "attained the limiting age
under the mortality table on which the reserve is based."3 6 For instance,
if the limiting age were 70 and the insured, if living, would have reached
that age by 1970, the funds could be escheated by the state of his last
known address after 1977. This assumes that the insured cannot be located
and has not corresponded with the company during those seven years.
Missouri's statute concerning the escheat of insurance funds accumulated
pending rate determinations was repealed in 1972.
37
Section four of the Uniform Act specifies that deposits made with a
utility company which does business within the state to secure payment
for services to be furnished within the state are abandoned if unclaimed
within seven years of the termination of service. Any refunds the company
is required to make for overcharges also are presumed abandoned after
of domicile of the corporation, and (2) the state of residence had no escheat
provision or there was no last known address of the owner.
32. Oregon Racing Comm'n v. Multnomah Kennel Club, 242 Or. 572, 411
P.2d 63 (1966).
33. RSMo § 361.210 (1978).
34. Id. This statute was interpreted in Jones v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 362 Mo. 712, 243 S.W.2d 970 (En Banc 1951).
35. See UNIFORM DIsPosIrIoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 3, Commis-
sioners' Note (1966). Under this provision the state of incorporation is not
allowed to claim the funds payable to an owner who is the resident of another
state even if that other state has no escheat provision. In this respect, the standard
established by Texas v. New Jersey is broader, allowing such escheat so long as
the state is the state of corporate domicile and there is no address of record or the
state of last known address has no escheat provision.
36. UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 3 (1954 Version).
37. 1941 Mo. Laws 396, § 5985a (formerly codified as RSMo § 379.395, re-
pealed 1972). In many instances, however, RSMo § 470.270 (1978), which deals
with property involved in or resulting from litigation, would provide a basis on
which to escheat such funds.
(Vol. 45
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seven years.38 Unless the services as to which a refund was ordered or a
deposit made were rendered within the state, a state cannot assert custody
rights under the Uniform Act.39 The only Missouri statute relevant to
the abandonment of property by utility customers is a general statute
dealing with property involved in or resulting from litigation.40 Although
this statute may reach those instances where a rebate is ordered by the
court in a judicial proceeding, utility deposits and other refunds are not
made subject to escheat.
Section five of the Uniform Act, which pertains to "any stock or
other certificate of ownership, or any dividend, profit, distribution, in-
terest, payment on principal, or other sum held or owing by a business
association," provides two bases of jurisdiction. Such property is subject
to the jurisdiction of the state (1) if held by a business association or-
ganized under the laws of the state, or (2) if held by a business association
doing business in the state and if the last known address of the owner is
within the state.4 1 As with banking deposits under section two, the re-
ciprocal provision provided by section ten comes into play. If the corporate
holder is incorporated under Missouri law but the last known address of
the owner is in another state which has enacted a reciprocal provision,
the "dual standard is resolved into the single standard of the last known
address of the owner."42 The Supreme Court decision in Texas v. New
Jersey43 would have the effect of denying the state's escheat of property
based upon the domicile of the holder if there is an owner whose last
known address is in another state which has an applicable escheat pro-
vision.
Under section five, the statutory period which must elapse before
abandonment is presumed is seven years, and the owner must not have
corresponded with the holder within that period of time. Missouri cur-
rently has no escheat provision which would govern the items covered by
this section. The result is that such property is subject to escheat by
another state which is the domicile of the corporation even if the last
known address of the owner is within Missouri.44 For example, assume
38. Consideration should be given to possible modification of this type of
provision because of the costs to the utility company of publishing notice, keep-
ing records for long periods of time, and other administrative burdens. Perhaps a
better alternative would be to provide that there is no need to publish the names
of owners if the property involved is worth less than $25. Such a provision was
upheld in State v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 29 N.J. Super. 116, 101 A.2d 598(Ch. Div. 1953). But see Clovis Natl Bank v. Callaway, 69 N.M. 119, 126, 364 P.2d
748, 752 (1961).
39. The Texas v. New Jersey standard would allow escheat if the state of
last known address had no applicable escheat statute. See note 31 supra.
40. RSMo § 470.270 (1978).
41. The term "business association" has been held to include a nonprofit
corporation. In re Monks Club, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d 845, 394 P.2d 804 (1964).
42. Comment, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J., supra note 2, at 91.
43. 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
44. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
1980]
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that a Missouri resident worked for a company incorporated in Iowa. He
quit work and left without claiming his last month's wages. Even though
his last known address is in Missouri, because Missouri has no applicable
escheat provision Iowa can escheat the sum owed after seven years have
elapsed. Considering the large number of Missouri residents employed
outside the state, this could mean a substantial loss of revenue. By re-
incorporating in Missouri within the seven-year period, the company could
avoid escheat in either state and be able to retain the money. So long as
the reincorporation took place before the necessary time period had
elapsed under Iowa law, the property would not be subject to escheat by
that state, and Missouri has no applicable provision.
Section six specifies that unclaimed intangible property which is
distributable upon the dissolution of a business association, banking or-
ganization, or financial organization organized under the laws of or created
in .the state, is presumed abandoned after two years. Missouri has two
statutes which might achieve the same result in certain instances. Under
Mo. Rev. Stat. section 361.210, similar treatment is afforded unclaimed
property following the liquidation of a bank or trust company. Mo. Rev.
Stat. section 470.010 also might apply should the dissolution of any type
of corporation be achieved by means of an assignment for the benefit of
creditors or the appointment of a receiver. The Missouri provisions again
fail to cover all the situations which might arise. For example, a statutory
dissolution of a non-banking corporation would not be covered.
Section seven of the Uniform Act provides that all intangible property
and any income thereon which are held in a fiduciary capacity are pre-
sumed abandoned if the owner has not dealt in some way with the prop-
erty or income or indicated an interest therein within seven years after
they became payable or distributable. The property must be held by (1)
a banking or financial organization, or by a business association organized
under the laws of or created in the state; (2) a foreign business doing busi-
ness within the state; or (3) any other person if it is held in the state.45
Again, section ten would be applicable if the other state involved had a
provision for reciprocity.46 Missouri has no statute similar to section seven.
Under section eight, all intangible property held by any court, public
corporation, public authority, or public officer of either the state or a
political subdivision thereof, is presumed abandoned if it has remained
unclaimed for more than seven years. 47 Escheat would seem to be allowed
regardless of the last known address of the owner. 48
A catchall provision was added to the Uniform Act in section nine.
45. UNIFORm DISPOSmON OF UNCLAIAMD PROPERTY Aar § 7 (1954 Version).
46. Comment, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J., supra note 2, at 91.
47. Minnesota amended this provision to exclude property of those held in
public correctional institutions. MmN. STAT. ANN. § 345.28 (West 1969).
48. Comment, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J., supra note 2, at 91. Texas v. New Jersey
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This section covers all intangible property not otherwise covered which
is held and owing in the state in the ordinary course of the holder's
business. The Commissioners' Note to section nine stresses that the property
must be held in the "ordinary course of the holder's business within this
state," and lists several examples of items embraced by this section. The
items listed include:
amounts due and payable under the terms of insurance policies
not covered by section 4, pension trust agreements, profit-sharing
plans, credit balances on paid wages, security deposits, refunds,
funds deposited to redeem stocks, bonds, coupons and other
securities, or to make a distribution thereof, together with any
interest or increment thereon.4 9
Again, abandonment is presumed if such property is unclaimed for more
than seven years after becoming payable or distributable. 50
The most important provision of the Uniform Act as it relates to the
elimination of multiple liability is section ten. The Commissioners' Note
accompanying that section provides that "if two states, each having contact
with the transaction, have each adopted the Act, the jurisdictional test
becomes the last known address of the owner." As previously indicated, at
the time the Uniform Act was drafted the United States Supreme Court
had taken no stand concerning multiple liability of holders of intangible
property who were subject to the jurisdiction of more than one state.5 1
The decision of Texas v. New Jersey,5 2 however, makes the section less
significant today.
The remaining sections of the Uniform Act set forth such procedural
requirements as when to report the holding of any unclaimed property 53
49. UNIrFoRm DIsrosMoN OF UNC.AIMED PROPERTY Acr § 9, Commissioners'
Note (1966). Many states have modified this list in their versions of the Act.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-22-10 (1975).
50. This catchall provision indicates the intent of the drafters to subject
virtually all types of property to escheat by the adopting state. The experience
in the various states has demonstrated their willingness to fulfill such an intent,
and is reflected by the variety of items they have escheated thus far. See In re
Moneys Deposited, 41 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (bribe money offered a
public official); State v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 261 Cal. App. 2d 609, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 67 (1968) (uncollected wages of seamen); State v. U.S. Steel Co., 12 N.J.
51, 95 A.2d 740 (1953) (unredeemed cafeteria coupons); State ex rel. Mallicoat
v. Coe, 254 Or. 365, 460 P.2d 357 (1969) (school redemption bonds); Common-
wealth v. Binenstock, 366 Pa. 519, 77 A.2d 628 (1951) (uncollected condemna-
tion awards). States also have claimed: tax refunds, vacant cemetery lots, wit-
ness and juror fees, money orders and travelers' checks, and things received in
the course of business by pawnbrokers, cleaners, and express companies. See
Lake, Escheat, Federalism and State Boundaries, 24 Omo ST. L.J. 322, 326 (1963);
Note, 61 COLUM. L. Rxv., supra note 3, at 1332-36. The state of New Jersey
unsuccessfully attempted to escheat the estimated dollar amount of issued but
unredeemed S & H Green Stamps. State v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 23 N.J. 38,
127 A.2d 169 (1956).
51. See text accompanying notes 17-25 supra.
52. 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
53. UNIFORM DisrosrrloN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACr § 11 (1954 Version).
1980]
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the notice which is to be given, 54 the manner in which the state must
handle the property,5 5 and how the true owner may file a claim.56 As
indicated in the commissioners' notes immediately following each section
of the Act, many of these provisions have been modified by the various
states which have adopted the Uniform Act in order to have the Act
conform with time periods established by prior state escheat provisions
or with state fiscal provisions,57 and some change may be necessary in
Missouri. The need to modify particular sections will be shown in the
following discussion of some problem areas encountered under the Act
and some possible solutions to these problems.
IV. CHALLENGES TO VALID=TY
The Uniform Act has been challenged on a number of grounds.
Many of the issues raised appear to have been resolved fully. A brief
discussion of the primary ones, however, will point out possible challenges
to any future legislation in Missouri in this area. A number of problems
not yet resolved fully also will be presented and suggestions made as to
their possible solution.
A. Impairment of Contract
A primary objection interposed by those parties seeking to prevent
enforcement of the Uniform Act and similar escheat statutes has been
that of impairment of contract under article I, section 10 of the United
States Constitution.5 8 The contention is that the statute transforms a con-
ditional obligation into a liquidated obligation, contrary to any provision
in the contract between obligor and obligee. This argument has been
uniformly rejected by the courts.59 The state is acting merely as a con-
servator of the property, not as a party to the contract. Because there is
usually no contract between the obligor and obligee as to disposition of
the property if the owner should fail to assert his claim, no contract is
impaired. The obligee still is entitled to assert his claim against the
state; there is merely a change in remedy for him. As for the obligor, if
the state to which he relinquished the property was lawfully entitled to
demand the transfer, he is relieved of further liability.
54. Id. § 12.
55. Id. §§ 17-18.
56. Id. §§ 19-21.
57. Although various states have modified these procedural provisions, the
basic format is as follows: (1) filing of a report by the holder by a specified
date; (2) publication of notice to the owner by the state; (3) mailing of notice
to the owner's last known address; (4) owner has 65 days in which to claim his
property from the holder; (5) twenty days after the time for demand to be
made of the holder, holder delivers the property to the proper state official; and
(6) sale by the state within one year, with a percentage of the proceeds being
retained to meet any claims which might be forthcoming. McBride, supra note
12, at 1065.
58. See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett,
321 U.S. 233 (1944); Security Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
59. See, e.g., cases cited note 58 supra.
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A second ground on which attempts to escheat property have been
challenged is that of lack of jurisdiction.60 Escheat at common law rep-
resents the reversionary interest or right of the lord to take for want of a
tenant; it was applicable only to property which could be the subject
of tenure. It gradually has extended to include both tangible and intangible
personal property.61 As to real and tangible personal property, the chal-
lenge of lack of jurisdiction seldom arises. Generally the res must have
its situs within a state in order for that state to have escheat jurisdiction.62
With respect to unclaimed intangible property, on the other hand, the
question of escheat jurisdiction has been unclear.
Early Supreme Court cases were decided on the basis of the "minimum
contacts" standard.63 The result was that a number of states could es-
tablish jurisdiction as to the same property. The Court attempted to
preclude multiple liability of the holder of the property by stating that
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution was applicable. 64 In
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania,65 however, the Court
acknowledged that the clause would not always be an effective bar to
multiple liability.66 In fact, the Court precluded that possibility by holding
that a second payment could not be demanded by another state because
doing so would deprive the holder of substantive due process. 67 The Court
held that any conflicts among the states must be settled in a court where
all the states could present their claims for a binding determination, and
that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to make such a deter-
mination.68 In Texas v. New Jersey, the question finally was decided. If
the state of the last known address of the owner has an applicable escheat
provision, it is the only state which can escheat the property. If it has
no applicable escheat provision or if no last known address is of record,
the state of corporate domicile may escheat the property.6 9
60. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948); Secur-
ity Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
61. 27 AM. JuR. 2d Escheat § 5 (1966).
62. Id. § 4.
63. See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 439 (1951); Connecti-
cut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
64. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 443 (1951).
65. 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
66. For an early lower court decision to the same effect, see Biddy v. Blue
Bird Air Serv., 374 Ill. 506, 30 N.E.2d 14 (1940).
67. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961).
68. Id. at 77. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Kervick, 60 N.J. 289, 288 A.2d 289 (1972)
One state still may sue in another's state court for the purposes of escheat. If a
state does so, it "lays aside its sovereignty," and is to be dealt with as though a
private litigant. Id. at 297, 288 A.2d at 293.
69. This is the accepted interpretation of the Court's opinion in Texas v.
New Jersey, and appears to be in accordance with the analysis used therein, as
well as with most statutory provisions then in effect. In State v. Texas Elec.
Serv.. Co., 488 S.W.2d 878 (rex. Civ. App. 1972), however, the Texas court
placed the following interesting interpretation on the case:
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The decision in Texas v. New Jersey resolved a major problem facing
states with conflicting claims to the same property. Probably the largest
problem confronting those states, however, was engendered by that de-
cision. If the only state which can escheat unclaimed intangible property
is the state of the owner's last known address, and the holder of the
property is located elsewhere, can the state of last known address compel
the holder to report such property? If so, can it bring suit in its own court
system to compel the transfer of such property?70 Unless the state has
some practical means of enforcement, a corporation is unlikely to comply
with a state law requiring the transfer of such property or to volunteer
information as to any unclaimed property it might hold.
If the corporate holder of unclaimed property has sufficient contacts
with the state of last known address to satisfy the jurisdictional test es-
tablished by International Shoe Co. v. Washington,7 1 the state probably
can enforce its right to obtain the information 7 2 On the other hand,
where the corporation is incorporated elsewhere, does its business else-
where, and has its principal place of business outside the state, it seems
unlikely that the state can establish sufficient jurisdiction to regulate the
corporation on the sole basis that one of its shareholders lives there. 3 To
solve the reporting dilemma, a legislature could amend sections ten and
eleven of the Uniform Act to provide that corporations incorporated in
that state report all unclaimed property which would be subject to escheat
by any state. This would be effective if all states had an escheat provision
similar to that of the state of regulation. Each state should then have a
provision for the exchange of information concerning property which is
subject to escheat by other states. 74
Under the rule laid down in Texas v. New Jersey the state of appel-
lee's corporate domicile, Texas, is entitled to escheat the dividends in
question and hold them until such time as it may be shown that the state
of last known address has a law providing for their escheat. At that time
they would go to that state. .-. . Texas v. New Jersey requires the state
of last known address to make claim against the state of corporate domi-
cile for the dividends in question.
Id. at 882. At first glance this construction appears contrary to the spirit of Texas
v. New Jersey. The state which is first to escheat would do so without regard
to the last known address of the owner, and only by litigation would the state
of last known address gain the property. If the state of last known address
should fail to assert its claim, the earlier state would remain in possession of
the property. When one considers the problem to which Texas v. New Jersey
gave rise, however, the reasoning of the court in State v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co.
proves useful. It suggests a method by which the state of last known address
may enforce its claim against a holder of property who is located outside of
that state's jurisdiction. See note 74 infra.
70. Comment, 41 NoTE DtmE LAw., supra note 2, at 559.
71. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
72. Comment, 41 NoTRE DAsmE LAw., supra note 2, at 559.
73. Id. at 570-78.
74. Oklahoma added a provision to the Uniform Act which authorizes its
state officials to make available, on a reciprocal basis, information with respect
to property reported under the terms of its legislation which appears to be
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Even assuming that the state may obtain such information, the
question remains whether it then may enforce its right in its own judicial
system. Although suit could be brought in the corporation's state of
domicile,7 5 the expense incurred frequently would outweigh the benefits
derived, especially when the amount of property involved is small. There-
fore, the state must try to establish the minimum contacts necessary to
confer jurisdiction upon its own courts. Location of an agent within the
state and conduct of business through use of the mails have been held
sufficient to confer jurisdiction in cases where an individual has sought
redress.7 6 Use of the mails merely to communicate with a shareholder,
however, probably is not sufficient to subject a corporation to that state's
jurisdiction.77 It appears that unless the corporation somehow is made
subject to the jurisdiction of the claimant state or unless the property is
of enough value to justify the use of another forum, the corporation may
be able to retain the unclaimed property as a windfall conferred upon it
by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Texas v. New Jersey.
C. Due Process
Escheat statutes also have been challenged on due process grounds.
Procedural due process establishes a dual requirement of adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard.78 Notice provisions such as those of the
Uniform Act have been held to fulfill the due process requirements.7 9
Personal notice to the holder in conjunction with notice by publication
subject to escheat as unclaimed property by the laws of other states. It then
provides that upon claim and proper proof by the state that the last known
address of the owner is within the state and that the property is subject to
escheat by the laws of that state, the Oklahoma officials shall surrender to it
any property of such owner or proceeds thereof that may have come into its
custody under its escheat provisions. OxrA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 683-684 (1979).
The above-mentioned provisions, in conjunction with the reasoning of the
court in State v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 488 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972),
could be utilized to solve the problem of enforcement encountered when the
state of last known address lacks jurisdiction over the holder of the property.
Each state would simply collect and hold all unclaimed property from within
its boundaries, subject to proof by another state that it is entitled thereto. Upon
such proof, the property would be released to that state. Some provision should
be included for the reimbursement of the holding state for any costs it may have
incurred in the collection of the property.
75. Comment, 41 NOTREa Da LAw., supra note 2, at 570. The procedure
suggested in note 74 supra would avoid costly litigation in the courts of the
other state by allowing that state to escheat the property initially, and then by
providing an administrative procedure whereby the property would be turned
over upon proper claim and proof that another state is entitled thereto.
76. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). But see Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
77. See Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571, 577 (1980).
78. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
79. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 247 (1944); Security
Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 287 (1923); State v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 117 N.J. Super. 38, 42, 283 A.2d 543, 547 (Ch. Div. 1971), modified, 62
N.J. 50, 298 A.2d 65 (1972); Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Callaway, 69 N.M. 119, 127, 364
P.2d 748, 754 (1961).
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to the owner has been held to be sufficient.8 0 An opportunity to be heard
also is provided by the Uniform Act.81 The owner can later claim his
property from the state, which merely takes custody of the property.82
Under section twenty the state treasurer is to examine all claims filed; he
may conduct a hearing and receive evidence concerning such claims.88
Should the decision of the official prove unsatisfactory, the aggrieved
party may file an action in the circuit court to establish his claim.8 4
D. Statutes of Limitations
A fourth problem which has confronted the states which have en-
acted the Uniform Act is engendered by section sixteen, which purports
to treat unclaimed property as subject to escheat even if the statute of
limitations had run prior to the date on which abandonment is presumed.
There are two situations which have arisen under section sixteen, and the
manner in which each is resolved is dependent upon the adopting state's
interpretation of the effect of its statute of limitations. The first situation
concerns property against which the statute of limitations had run prior
to the effective date of the Act. The second problem arises when the
number of years which must elapse before abandonment is presumed
is longer than the applicable statute of limitations.
The effectiveness of section sixteen in both of these situations is de-
pendent upon whether the courts of the adopting state have. held that
the expiration of the statute of limitations creates a vested property right
in the holder. If so, the owner is absolutely barred, and the state cannot
escheat the property.85 Therefore, property against which the statute of
limitations has run prior to the effective date of the Act cannot be
escheated. There is also a problem as to other property against which the
statute has not run on the effective date of the Act, but where the number
80. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 841 U.S. 428 (1951); Anderson Nat'l
Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 283 (1944); Security Sav. Bank v. California, 268 U.S.
282 (1928); State v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank &c Trust Co., 117 N.J. Super. 88,
288 A.2d 548 (Ch. Div. 1971), modified, 62 N.J. 50, 298 A.2d 65 (1972); Clovis Nat'l
Bank v. Callaway, 69 N.M. 119, 864 P.2d 748 (1961). Although some cases have
asserted that mere seizure of the property constitutes sufficient notice to the
owner, Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett implies that some additional action such
as publication is necessary. 821 U.S. at 248. But see Corn Exch. Bank v. Coler,
280 U.S. 218 (1980).
81. UNIFORm DIsPosrTION OF UNCLAMED PROPERTY Acr §§ 20-21 (1954
Version).
82. Id. § 20.
88. Id.
84. Id. §21.
85. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1989); County
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knight, 40 Ill. 2d 428, 240 N.E.2d 612 (1968); Parsons v. Standard
Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950), af'd, 841 U.S. 428 (1951); Mires v.
Hogan, 79 Okla. 288, 192 P. 811 (1920). See Note, Abandoned Chattels and
Intangible Things as a Source of Revenue, 42 IowA L. REv. 899, 408 (1957). The
United States Supreme Court has held that any attempt to take away a vested
right by statute is a violation of due process. States which interpret their statutes
of limitations to be vested rights cannot provide for escheat of property against
which the period has run. Stewart v. Keys, 295 U.S. 408 (1985).
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of years which must elapse before abandonment is presumed exceeds the
applicable statute of limitations. One approach has been to shorten the
period of time required for the presumption of abandonment to arise so
that the property can be escheated before the statute of limitations has
expired.8 6 The other approach has been to amend the applicable statute
of limitations so as to make it dear that the expiration of any period of
limitations shall not prevent property from being presumed abandoned.8 7
In those states which do not interpret the expiration of the period
of limitations as creating a vested property right in the holder, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the state may repeal or extend its
statute of limitations even after the owner's right of action is barred with-
out violating the fourteenth amendment.8 8 Thus, section sixteen is ef-
fective in both the situation where the statute has expired prior to the
effective date of the Act and in the situation where the period of limita-
tions is shorter than that necessary for the presumption of abandonment.
This difference in interpretation as to the effect of a statute of limita-
tions arguably is the result of the hostility of early courts to such statutes.89
To strip a statute of its often harsh effects, some courts held that the
limitation extinguished only the remedy of direct judicial action and not
the underlying right.90 Those courts were able to find that some action
on the part of the defendant waived the bar or revived the remedy.9 1
General statutes of limitations came to be regarded as merely procedural,
creating no property right in the defendant which would be subject to
fourteenth. amendment protection. 92 The right of the plaintiff being
still in existence, it was property which might be subjected to escheat.93
86. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-29 (West Supp. 1978).
87. E.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1515 (West 1979).
88: Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Campbell v. Holt,
115 U.S. 620 .(1885).
89. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv.
1176, 1187 (1950).
90. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); Bomud Co. v. Yockey Oil
Co., 180 Kan. 109, 299 P.2d 72 (1956); Stock v. Schloman, 322 Mo. 1209, 18
S.W.2d 428 (1929).
91. A new promise to pay the debt, an unqualified acknowledgment of the
debt, partial payment, or any conduct on the part of a defendant whereby the
plaintiff is led not to assert his right to sue, have all been held to "waive" the
statute of limitations. See Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U.S. 231 (1887); Buescher
v. Lastar, 61 Cal. App. 3d 73, 132 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1976); Chidsey v. Powell, 91
Mo. 622, 4 S.W. 446 (1887). In South Carolina Tax Comm'n v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 266 S.C. 34, 221 S.E.2d 522 (1975), it was held that where a
company typically made payments on policies at the time when claims were
presented, regardless of the fact that the statute of limitations had run, it had
waived the application of the statute as to policyholders. As a result, the com-
pany was not allowed to plead the statute as a bar to an action by the tax com-
mission.
92. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Campbell v.
Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885). See generally Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1176, 1187 (1950).
93. Evans Prod. Co. v. Fry, 307 Mich. 506, 12 N.W.2d 448 (1943); In re
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 352 Pa. 457, 43 A.2d 116 (1945).
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When a statute which created a cause of action in derogation of the
common law contained its own limitations, the courts were less lenient
toward plaintiffs and sometimes held the limitations to be substantive. 94
The result of such an interpretation was to extinguish completely not
only the remedy but the statutory right as well.95 A later amendment of
the period of limitations thus had no effect. Although some cases state
that a property right is vested in the defendant which is subject to the
protection of the fourteenth amendment,9 6 there is perhaps_ a better
analysis of these cases in the context of an escheat provision. At the time
the period of limitations expired, the right of the owner no longer existed.
Just as the right could not be revived by any subsequent act of the de-
fendant, neither was there anything to be affected by amendment of the
period of limitations or to be escheated under an escheat provision. Hence,
section sixteen would be ineffective.
Missouri courts have held that no one has a vested right in a statute
of limitations.97 Such statutes are construed as procedural ,rather than
substantive, i.e., they merely suspend the remedy without extinguishing
the right.9 8 It would seem, therefore, that the state subsequently could
amend the period of limitations so as to affect causes of action already
barred, but "[revival by statute of a right of action already barred is
an extreme exercise of legislative power which will not be deduced from
words of doubtful meaning."9 9 Thus the intent of the legislature must
be clear, or such an act will not be construed so as to affect causes of
action already barred. The better approach would seem to be for the
Missouri legislature to provide for the presumption of abandonment to
arise before the expiration of any limitations period which is applicable
to the type of claim or right involved. The problem of construing par-
ticular statutes of limitations is avoided, as are the innumerable chal-
lenges based upon fourteenth amendment rights. As for claims which are
barred prior to the effective date of the Act, it would be advisable for
the legislature to state whether these claims are to be subject to the Act
and, if so, to set some definite parameters on how far back the claims
should reach.1 00
94. These statutes have been characterized as offers of action on condition
that they be accepted within the time limit set by the statute. The time limit
becomes a part of the right of action itself and limits both the remedy and the
right. Once the set period of time elapses, the right is gone. 51 AM. JuR. 2d
Limitations of Actions § 15 (1971).
95. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199 (1915); Smith v.
Eureka Pipe Line Co., 122 W. Va. 277, 8 S.E.2d 890 (1940).
96. See authorities cited note 85 supra.
97. Rabin v. Krogsdale, 346 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Mo. 1961).
98. Rincon v. Rincon, 571 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
99. State v. Hall. 358 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
100. The best approach would be to modify § 16 of the Uniform Act in order
to render it ineffective as to property against which the statute of limitations has
run prior to the effective date of the Act. Wisconsin has thus modified its statute.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 177.06 (West 1974).
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E. Conflicts With Federal Regulations
Another problem which has been encountered when enforcing the
Uniform Act is that of priority in instances where a provision of the
Act conflicts with federal regulations in the same area. In United States
v. Board of Commissioners,'0o the Maryland Escheat Act was held inap-
plicable to the amount of the net estate of a veteran which was attribut-
able to pension benefits paid by the Veterans Administration. The crucial
issue in such cases is whether there is indeed a conflict between state law
and federal regulations. For example, state statutes providing for escheat
of property held by national banks were the subject of much controversy.
National banks are not subject to regulation by a state to the extent that
such regulation contravenes some federal legislation or hinders their
performance as federal agencies. In Anderson National Bank v. Luckett,10 2
which tested the validity of Kentucky's custodial-type legislation as ap-
plied to solvent national banks, the Supreme Court found no conflict
between the legislation and any national law or purpose. As to national
banks in the process of liquidation, however, the provision of the National
Bank Act directing payment of unclaimed deposits to the shareholders or
their legal representatives in proportion to the stock held by them does
seem to present a conflict. The Supreme Court was presented with this
question in Roth v. Delano,10 3 but avoided the issue on the ground that
the Michigan statute in question had since been repealed, and that to
render a declaratory judgment subsequent thereto would be to "render
an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of a repealed State act."'-0 4
Due to the apparent conflict with the National Bank Act, many states
modified their statutes so as to render them inapplicable to national
banks in the process of liquidation. Section six of the Uniform Act appears
to adopt this approach, referring to the dissolution of bank organizations
"organized under the laws of or created in this state."
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the many problems which initially might be encountered in
its enforcement, the Missouri legislature is strongly urged to adopt some
comprehensive legislation in the area of escheat. Existing Missouri legisla-
tion is inadequate, and leaves a large amount of unclaimed property in
the hands of private holders. Compliance with and enforcement of Mis-
souri law is hampered by the disorganized condition of the current
statutory compilation.10 5 Revenue is being lost; property that could be
101. 432 F. Supp. 629 (D. Md. 1977).
102. 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
103. 388 U.S. 226 (1949).
104. Id. at 231.
105. For statutes relating to escheat, see RSMo § 136.010 (1978) (collection
of money payable to the state); § 141.580 (1978) (escheat of excess funds from tax
foreclosure sale); § 202.060 (1978) (escheat of funds in care of state mental health
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claimed by the state of Missouri may be subject to escheat by other states
due to the lack of an applicable escheat statute in Missouri. For example,
any unclaimed property of a Missouri citizen who worked for a corpora-
tion whose .domicile was in Iowa would be subject to escheat only by
Missouri if Missouri had an applicable statute. Because Missouri does
not have such a statute, Iowa is able to escheat the property at the expense
of Missouri residents.106 Although the decision of Texas v. New Jersey
indicates that if Missouri should later enact an escheat provision subject-
ing such property to escheat it could recover this property from the
state of Iowa, the typical approach of other states has been to expressly
decline to do so. 107
Another factor supporting the adoption of such legislation is that
the property is taken only from those who are unjustly enriched by its
abandonment. Companies which have underpaid employees, utility com-
panies whose customers fail to recover their deposits, and life insurance
companies which hold uncollected proceeds have no greater right to the
benefits of the unclaimed funds than does any private citizen. Such re-
sources should work for the benefit of all through the medium of the
state government rather than for the person who holds them as a result
of some fortuitous circumstance.
In a time of financial difficulty and increasing opposition to taxation,
an act.which would produce revenue without the imposition of a heavier
burden on the taxpayer should be considered, and it is strongly urged
that the Missouri legislature do so. The success of such statutes in other
states indicates what results might be expected.
In its, consideration of escheat legislation, the Uniform Act should
be examined as a model. Necessary revisions to the Uniform Act would
not create problems because the need for uniformity was greatly diminished
by the decision in Texas v. New Jersey. The value of the Uniform Act
lies in its provisions having been tested and in the case law which has
been developed which explains its many provisions. Use of the Uniform
Act in drafting escheat legislation is therefore recommended. But whether
or not the Uniform Act fulfills the desires of the legislature, it should
consider some type of legislation in the near future before still more
revenue is lost.
Jo BETH PREwrrr
institutions when owner is unknown or unlocated); § 361.210 (1978) (unclaimed
deposits of liquidated bank and trust companies); §§ 470.010-.350 (1978) (de-
cedents' estates and funds in the custody of courts); § 475.825 (1978) (escheat of
estate upon nonacceptance by minor). See also RSMo ch. 447 (1978) (lost and
unclaimed property).
106. See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.s. 674 (1965).
107. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-645 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2901(Supp. 1979). The Uniform Act also has a provision to this effect. UNrFORm
DISPOSrTxON OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT § 27 (1966).
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